void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *dh);
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
long SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, DH *dh)
DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
DESCRIPTION
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback function for
ctx to be used when a DH parameters
are required to tmp_dh_callback. The
callback is inherited by all ssl
objects created from ctx.
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() sets DH parameters to be used to be dh. The key is inherited by all ssl objects created from ctx.
SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback only for ssl.
SSL_set_tmp_dh() sets the parameters only for ssl.
These functions apply to SSL/TLS servers only.
NOTES
When using a cipher with RSA authentication, an ephemeral DH key
exchange can take place. Ciphers with DSA keys always use ephemeral
DH keys as well. In these cases, the session data are negotiated
using the ephemeral/temporary DH key and the key supplied and
certified by the certificate chain is only used for signing.
Anonymous ciphers (without a permanent server key) also use ephemeral
DH keys.
Using ephemeral DH key exchange yields forward secrecy, as the
connection can only be decrypted, when the DH key is known. By
generating a temporary DH key inside the server application that is
lost when the application is left, it becomes impossible for an
attacker to decrypt past sessions, even if he gets hold of the normal
(certified) key, as this key was only used for signing.
In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always
generate a new DH key during the negotiation, when the DH parameters
are supplied via callback and/or when the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option
of SSL_CTX_set_options(3)
is set. It will immediately create a DH key, when DH parameters are
supplied via SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not
set. In this case, it may happen that a key is generated on
initialization without later being needed, while on the other hand
the computer time during the negotiation is being saved.
If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not
strictly necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it
does improve forward secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong"
primes were used (see especially the section about DSA parameters
below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small
subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on
the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very
large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable
this option.
As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an
application should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply
the parameters. DH parameters can be reused, as the actual key is
newly generated during the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH
parameters is that an attacker may specialize on a very often used DH
group. Applications should therefore generate their own DH parameters
during the installation process using the openssl dhparam(1) application. In order to
reduce the computer time needed for this generation, it is possible
to use DSA parameters instead (see dhparam(1)), but in this case
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is mandatory.
Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem,
dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096 in the 'apps' directory of current
version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters,
which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly.
These files can be converted into C code using the -C option of the dhparam(1) application. Authors may
also generate their own set of parameters using dhparam(1), but a user may not be
sure how the parameters were generated. The generation of DH
parameters during installation is therefore recommended.
An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or can
supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback
approach has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH
parameters for different key lengths.
The tmp_dh_callback is called with
the keylength needed and the
is_export information. The is_export flag is set, when the ephemeral DH
key exchange is performed with an export cipher.
EXAMPLES
Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error
handling partly left out.)
...
/* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */
DH *dh_512 = NULL;
DH *dh_1024 = NULL;
FILE *paramfile;
...
/* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */
paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r");
if (paramfile) {
dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fclose(paramfile);
}
/* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */
paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r");
if (paramfile) {
dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fclose(paramfile);
}
...
/* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */
DH *get_dh512() { ... }
DH *get_dh1024() { ... }
DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
{
DH *dh_tmp=NULL;
switch (keylength) {
case 512:
if (!dh_512)
dh_512 = get_dh512();
dh_tmp = dh_512;
break;
case 1024:
if (!dh_1024)
dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
dh_tmp = dh_1024;
break;
default:
/* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
setup_dh_parameters_like_above();
}
return(dh_tmp);
}
RETURN VALUES
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() do not
return diagnostic output.
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_set_tmp_dh() do return 1 on success and
0 on failure. Check the error queue to find out the reason of
failure.